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The Failed NYSE Euronext-Deutsche Birse Group
Merger: Foreshadowing Future Consolidation of the
Global Stock Exchange Market?
I. INTRODUCTION

International stock exchange mergers are part of the increasing
trend toward globalization in financial markets.' The proposed merger
between NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Bbrse Group is representative of
this trend, illustrating "a response to structural changes in the industry
that is increasingly becoming global." 2 The recent announcement that
Japan's two largest exchanges plan to merge is another example of
similar consolidation in the industry. 3 Whether an international stock
exchange merger is effectuated depends heavily on the approval of
various global antitrust regulators.4 Notwithstanding this fact, global
exchanges are pursuing mergers not only for the competitive advantage
but also to maintain market share in the global financial market.
"Megamergers," 6 such as the proposed NYSE Euronext-Deutsche Brse
1. See Michael D. Bordo, The Globalization of International Financial Markets: What
Can History Teach Us? 2 (Mar. 31, 2000) (unpublished paper prepared for conference
"International
Financial
Markets:
The
Challenge
of
Globalization"),
http://econweb.rutgers.edu/bordo/global.pdf.
2. Ulrike Dauer, Update: Deutsche Boerse CEO: NYSE Tie-Up Strengthens
Frankfurt, Europe, WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
14,
2011,
7:52
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111114-707465.html [hereinafter Dauer, Update].
3. See Tomoko A. Hosaka, Japan's 2 Biggest Exchanges to Join Hands Amid
Intensifying
Global
Competition,
CANADIAN
Bus.
(Nov.
22,
2011),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/58288-japan-s-2-biggest-exchanges-to-joinhands-amid-intensifying-global-competition.
4. Cf SEC Clears Way For NYSE, Deutsche Boerse to Merge, FOX NEWS (Jan. 18,
http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/01/18/sec-clears-way-for-nyse-deutsche2012),
boerse-to-merge/ [hereinafter SEC Clears Way].
5. See generally Jon Madslien, Embrace Globilisation, Business Told, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 28, 2006, 16:01 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/6192144.stm (discussing
the economic benefits of both businesses and nations being open to increased globalization).
6. See generally Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, "Mega-Mergers" in the Banking Industry, Address before the American
at
available
1999),
14,
(Apr.
Association
Bar
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/214845.pdf (discussing examples of recent
mega-mergers and their respective regulation within the banking industry).
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Group (NYX-DB) merger, are not new phenomena.7 The trend towards
globalization within the international stock exchange market began
more than a decade ago. 8 Although the NYX-DB merger was blocked
and ultimately abandoned, 9 it may predict future consolidation within
the international stock exchange market.
In addition to foreshadowing similar megamergers, the proposed
NYX-DB merger also exemplifies the numerous substantive and
procedural hurdles that future merger proposals must endure prior to
ultimate approval, disapproval, or abandonment. Although it is unlikely
that the NYX-DB merger would have had a significant negative impact
on the status quo of the global stock exchange market,10 the European
Commission blocked the merger for its potentially negative effect on
the European financial markets." However, this will not prevent future
companies from recognizing the issues associated with the NYX-DB
merger and remedying these problems in a manner designed to appease
international regulators.12 Continued globalization is vital to the
competitive advantage of key players in the international stock
exchange market.' 3
This Note discusses the implications that the proposed NYX-DB

7. See Brenda Goh, Factbox: A History of Global Exchange Merger Activity,
REUTERS (May 16, 2011, 12:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/16/us-factboxexchanges-idUSTRE74F4RJ20110516.
8. Id.
9. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Comm'n Blocks Proposed Merger
Between
Deutsche
Btrse
and
NYSE
Euronext
(Feb.
1,
2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/94 [hereinafter EC Blocks
Proposed Merger]; Press Release, New York Stock Exch., NYSE and Deutsche Boerse
Terminate
Business
Combination
Agreement
(Feb.
2,
2012),
http://www.nyse.com/press/1328178461772.html [hereinafter NYSE and Deutsche Boerse
Terminate].
10. Cf Grace Pownall et. al., The Post-Merger Segmentation ofEuronext: A Solution
to the Inadequacy of National Securities Regulators? 4 (May 2011), http://areas.kenanflagler.unc.edu/Accounting/Documents/2011 %20GIA%20Conference/The%2OPost%2OMer
ger/o20Segmentation%2%OoP/2OEuronext-Wang.pdf (discussing the minimal infrastructure
changes to the integrated trading platform of NYSE and Euronext).
11. See EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
12. Cf Gabriele Steinhauser, EU Leaning to Block NYSE-Deutsche Boerse Merger,
MSNBC
(Jan.
10,
2012,
3:26
PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45946737/ns/world-news-europe/t/eu-leaning-block-nysedeutsche-boerse-merger/#.TxfPU2POzcY.
13. See Madslien, supra note 5; C. Samuel Craig & Susan P. Douglas, Responding to
the Challenges of Global Markets: Change, Complexity, Competition and Conscience,
COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus., Spring 1997, at 70, 70.
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merger, even though ultimately blocked, 14 has for the future of the
global stock exchange market. Part II discusses the process for
completing a megamerger such as this one, including the proposed postmerger composition of the combined entity and the shareholder
approval process.' 5 Part III explains the regulatory approval process for
a global exchange merger such as the proposed NYX-DB merger,
including the various anti-competitive issues regulators analyze in the
decision-making process.16 Part IV examines the costs associated with
such global exchange megamergers, and chronicles the numerous
concessions that NYX-DB made during the regulatory approval
process.' 7 Part V discusses the potential benefits of such a megamerger,
both for the individual exchanges as well as for the markets and
economies affected.' 8 Part VI argues that the proposed merger should
have been approved because its benefits would have outweighed its
costs, and the effects on end-users would likely have been minimal.19
II. DETAILS OF THE NYX-DB MERGER

On February 15, 2011, the United States' New York Stock
Exchange Euronext (NYX) and Germany's Deutsche B6rse Group (DB
Group) announced their plans to merge, which would have created "the
world's largest stock market operator." 20 The exact value of the deal is
indeterminate, but the companies involved valued the merger at nearly
seventeen billion dollars. 21 NYX's commitment to merging with DB
Group was solidified when NYX publicly rejected NASDAQ's nineteen
percent higher counterbid. 2 Alpha Beta Netherlands Holding N.V.
14. See EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See Press Release, NYSE Euronext, Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext
Agree To Combine To Create The Premier Global Exchange Group (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.nyse.com/press/2 2011.html (click hyperlink for "15 Feb 11" press release)
[hereinafter Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine] (outlining the
merger plans in detail).
21. See Whitney Kisling, Collapsing Deutsche Boerse Takeover of NYSE Can Still
Return
45%:
Real M&A,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
7,
2011,
1:30
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-07/collapsing-deutsche-boerse-takeover-of-nysecan-still-retum-45-real-m-a.html.
22. See Jonathan Spicer & Jonathan Stempel, NYSE Snubs Nasdaq, Sticks with
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(HoldCo) would have served as the parent company of the business
combination, if approved.23
Executives of both entities hoped to close the deal before the
end of fiscal year 2011, but the regulatory approval process precluded
that goal.24 On July 7, 2011, NYX announced that approximately sixtyfive percent of NYX's outstanding shares had voted on the merger, with
over ninety-six percent of those voting approving the deal,25 easily
satisfying the simple majority vote needed to approve the deal.26
Following the NYX shareholder approval announcement, NYX
announced that approximately eighty-two percent of DB Group's
outstanding shares had voted to approve the merger,27 exceeding the
supermajority vote required.28
Both DB Group and NYX executives claimed that this proposed
combination would be a merger of the two companies, as opposed to an
acquisition by DB Group. 29 On its surface, this appears inconsistent
Deutsche
Boerse
Deal,
REUTERS
(Apr.
10,
2011,
7:56
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-nyseeuronext-idUSN 1020436920110410
(discussing NYX's reasons for choosing the Deutsche Birse deal over NASDAQ's offer);
Presentation, Michael Palmer, U. of Colo. at Boulder, FNCE 4070 Financial Markets and
Institutions
Lecture
5
(last
updated
Apr.
18,
2011),
http://leedsfaculty.colorado.edu/palmerm/09%20FNCE%204070%20Spring%202011 %20Equity%20M
arkets%20.ppt.
23. See Press Release, Deutsche Birse Group, German Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (BaFin) Approves Merger of Deutsche Bdrse and NYSE Euronext (Sept. 12,
2011),
http://deutscheboerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/notescontent/gdb navigation/home/INTEGRATE/mrpressrel
eases?notesDoc=572B6A7386763A08C12579090048C8CA&newstitle=germanfederalfinan
cialsupervis&location=home [hereinafter BaFin Approves Merger].
24. See generally Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE Takeover Faces Touchy Issues, WALL ST. J.,
Feb.
16,
2011,
at
Cl,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704409004576145992472922806.html
(discussing the potential problems with this merger).
25. See Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Euronext Shareholders
Overwhelmingly Approve Combination with Deutsche Boerse (July 7, 2011),
http://www.NYSE.com/press/1310032901736.html (announcing the support of NYX
shareholders for the merger).
26. See Tim Human, NYSE Euronext Shareholders Approve Merger with Deutsche
Borse,
INSIDE
INV.
RELATIONS
(July
7,
2011),
http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/articles/annual-meeting-and-voting/1 8319/nyseeuronext-shareholders-approve-merger-deutsche-borse/.
27. See Press Release, NYSE Euronext, Deutsche Boerse Shareholders Approve
Proposed
Combination
with
NYSE
Euronext
(July
15,
2011),
http://www.NYSE.com/press/1310724336979.html (announcing the support of Deutsche
B6rse Group shareholders for the merger).
28. Id.
29. See NYSE Euronext/DeutscheBoerse Merger Q&A with Duncan Niederauer,CEO
NYSE Euronext, NYSE EURONEXT EXCH. (June
18, 2011,
12:01 PM),
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with the fact that the consideration for the deal would have been one
share of the combined new company (HoldCo) 30 per share of DB
Group,3 1 whereas there would have only been "0.4700 shares of HoldCo
per share of NYX."3 2 If the deal had completed, the result would have
been a sixty percent shareholder ownership by DB Group and a forty
percent shareholder ownership by NYX.33
III. REGULATORY APPROVAL PROCESS

Megamergers of major securities exchanges of this type require
not only shareholder approval of the involved entities, but also approval
from various regulatory agencies.34 The agencies involved depend on
the jurisdictions in which the involved entities are headquartered.35 The
proposed NYX-DB merger required the approval of several agencies in
the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union. 6
http://exchanges.nyx.com/us-equities-news/NYSE-euronextdeutsche-boerse-merger-qaduncan-niederauer-ceo-NYSE-euronext [hereinafter Niederauer Q&A] (discussing CEO
Niederauer's reasons for combining with Deutsche Borse Group).
30. See Press Release, NYSE Euronext, Deutsche Bdrse AG and NYSE Euronext
Announce That Alpha Beta Netherlands Holding N.V. Will Not Pursue a Takeover Law
Squeeze-Out of the Remaining Deutsche B~rse AG Shareholders Who Have Not Tendered
(illustrating the
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.nyse.com/press/131547482413l.html
companies' reference of the proposed merged company as "HoldCo").
31. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
As of November 2011, the companies had yet to announce a proposed name for the merged
company. The Wall Street Journal speculated this delay as being the result of the companies
wanting to retain some leverage in dealing with the respective government agencies; Shira
Ovide, DasKapital? Still No Name for NYSE-Deutsche Boerse Deal, WALL ST. J. DEAL J.
(July 7, 2011, 11:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/07/07/daskapital-still-no-namefor-nyse-deutsche-boerse-deal/.
32. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
3 3. Id.
34. See generally INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS LAW: A COUNTRY-BYCOUNTRY LOOK AT M&A REGULATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES INMAJOR MARKETS AROUND

THE GLOBE (Aspatore Books 2005) (detailing merger rules and regulations in various
jurisdictions around the world); Guide to EC Merger Regulation, Fourth Edition, WILMER
CUTLER

PICKERING

HALE

AND

DOOR

LLP

(Jan.

2006),

http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/b7798dab-7870-4398-8d6309010efb7715/PresentationfPublicationAttachment/8ae67bcb-d0f3-4821-9577cc9a513d3d4f/ECMerger_4thedition.pdf.
35. See Stuart M. Chemtob, Special Counsel for Int'l Trade, Antitrust Div., The Role
of Competition Agencies in Regulated Sectors, Address at the 5th International Symposium
available at
2007),
11-12,
(May
Law
Policy and
on
Competition
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/225219.pdf
36. See Doug Cameron & Jacob Bunge, NYSE Euronext Deutsche Boerse Seek EU
2011),
29,
(June
J.
ST.
WALL
Approval,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304450604576415623840829138.html
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Because DB Group is incorporated in Germany and is a member of the
European Union, DB Group must abide by both German and European
law.3 7 NYX, being incorporated in the United States, is subject to the
authority of American administrative agencies.38 The proposed merger
was also subject to Dutch regulatory approval because the new holding
company would have been incorporated in the Netherlands. 39 Approval
by all relevant agencies is necessary to the completion of the merger,
with the European Commission's disapproval alone being sufficient to
block the merger.40
Antitrust regulators scrutinize such mergers because of the
potentially harmful effects they may have on competition. 4 1 NYX and
DB Group's joint press release was designed to solicit the proposed
merger not only to each company's shareholders, but also to the dozens
of global regulators from which NYX-DB needed approval before it
could proceed. 4 2 Even though it has been reported "[t]he NYSEDeutsche Boerse merger is expected to be the most solid business
combination in the history of the global stock exchanges,' 3 all
regulatory agencies evaluated potential consequences for their
respective financial markets and economies. Unfortunately for NYX(discussing the regulatory hurdles faced by NYX-DB, especially the significance of the EU
Stage Two investigation).
UNION,
EUR.
TO
THE
GATEWAY
37. See generally Germany, EUROPA:
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/germany/indexen.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2012) (describing various facts about Germany, including its status as the founding
member of the European Union).
38. See United States v. Deutsche Birse AG and NYSE Euronext; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,968, 81,975 (Dec. 29, 2011).
39. See generally Jurisdiction of the Courts - Netherlands, Eur. Comm'n,
(last
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/jurisdiction courts/jurisdictioncourtsneten.htm
updated July 19, 2007) (describing the legal process and jurisdictional authority of the
Netherlands).
40. See generally SEC Clears Way, supra note 4.
41. See
generally Mergers
Overview,
EUR.
COMM'N
COMPETITION,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/overviewen.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2012)
(discussing the standard by which the European Commission scrutinizes proposed mergers).
42. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission Opens In-Depth
Investigation Into Proposed Merger Between Deutsche B6rse and NYSE Euronext (Aug. 4,
2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/l 1/948 [hereinfater
Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation]; Cameron & Bunge, supra note 36.
43. Press Release, Zacks.com, The Zacks Analyst Blog Highlights: Monsanto, Dow
Chemical, Syngenta AG, The Scotts Miracle-Gro and NYSE Euronext (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/59672/The+Zacks+Analyst+Blog+Highlights%3A+Mon
santo,+Dow+Chemical,+Syngenta+AG,+The+Scotts+Miracle-Gro+and+NYSE+Euronext
[hereinafter Zacks Analyst Blog Highlights] (discussing the magnitude of such a merger as
the one NYX-DB proposes).
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DB, a few agencies were not immediately convinced that the merger
should proceed, and one was convinced to the contrary.44
A.

United States Regulatory Approval Process

Pursuant to Rule 425 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule
14a-12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,45 NYX and DB Group
filed forms with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 46
These forms included a "[rlegistration statement on Form F-4 with the
[SEC] that [included] a proxy statement of NYX that [also constituted]
a prospectus for Holding."4 7 Further, DB Group was required to file
offering documents with the SEC.4 8 On January 18, 2012, the SEC
officially approved the various applications and forms NYX and DB
Group submitted. 49 Although SEC approval is required, it is not enough
for the merger to be approved.so
In addition to the regulatory approval process by the SEC, the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is a
regulatory body comprised of government officials representing the
Departments of Justice, Commerce, State, Defense and Homeland
Security that "scrutinizes all international mergers made by U.S.-based
organizations."
The CFIUS's primary focus concerns potential
national security issues that may arise from such transactions.52 In
August 2011, NYX announced that CFIUS approved the merger,5 1 even

44. See Steinhauser,supranote 12; EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
45. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 77a (2006)).
46. See Alpha Beta Netherlands Holding N.V., Prospectuses and Commc'ns, Bus.
Combinations
(Form
425)
(Feb.
15,
2011),
available
at
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1368007/000119312511036869/d425.htm (offering the
information and addressing the concerns required by law in a 425 statement).
47. See id.
48. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
49. See SEC Clears Way, supra note 4.
50. Id.
51. Zacks Analyst Blog Highlights, supra note 43.
52.

See Resource Center: Process Overview, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfiusoverview.aspx (last updated Dec. 1, 2010) (discussing the process of CFIUS approval).
53. See Press Release, New York Stock Exch., CFIUS Completes Review of NYSE
Euronext
and
Deutsche
Boerse
Combination
(Aug.
23,
2011),
http://www.NYSE.com/press/1314004912749.html (announcing the Committee on Foreign
Investment's approval of the merger).
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though the CFIUS has rejected similar deals in the past.54 The CFIUS'
approval was a promising sign in the regulatory approval process.ss
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) represented another
major regulatory hurdle for the proposed merger. 56 The DOJ evaluates
the economic effects of proposed mergers by applying a "substantially
On December 22, 2011, the DOJ
lessen competition" standard.
approved the NYX-DB merger on the condition that DB Group divests
itself of International Securities Exchange (ISE).ss Eurex, a derivatives
exchange subsidiary of DB Group, jointly owns ISE with SIX Swiss
Exchange. 59 ISE owns approximately thirty-two percent of Direct Edge
Holdings LLC (Direct Edge), the fourth largest operator of stock
exchanges in the United States.60 Direct Edge is a direct competitor
with NYX "in displayed equities trading services and in the provision of
real-time proprietary equity data products." 61 Further, Direct Edge is a
potential competitor in the market for listing services of exchangetraded products.62 Because of the significant control the combined
entity would have over both competitors, the DOJ alleged that the
merger would substantially lessen competition and violate Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.63 Therefore, the DOJ's approval was contingent on the
54. See Jacob Bunge et al., Deutsche Boerse-NYSE Clears US Regulatory Hurdle,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110823-711590.html
(discussing how the CFIUS approved the NYSE-Deutsche Borse merger, despite having
blocked similar deals in the past).
55. See Zacks Analyst Blog Highlights, supra note 43.
56. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 § 20, 15 U.S.C. §
18a(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006); Richard Hill, NYSE Euronext Tells Congress Merger Would Have
No Impact on U.S. Competition, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1275 (June 20, 2011)
(announcing that executives of NYSE Euronext testified before Congress that the merger
would not have anti-competitive effects in the United States).
57. See Competition and Consolidation in Financial Markets: The NYSE-Deutsche
Boerse Merger: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition and
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2-3 (2011) (statement of Rep.
Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the
Internet)
[hereinafter
Goodlatte
Statement]
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/l 12th/i 12-42_66885.PDF.
58. See United States v. Deutsche Bdrse AG and NYSE Euronext; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,968, 81,976 (Dec. 29, 2011).
59. See Gregory J. Millman, NYSE-Borse Should Be Ready to Sacrifice ISE, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 15, 2011, 12:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/02/15/nyse-borse-should-beready-to-sacrifice-ise/.
60. United States v. Deutsche Bdrse AG and NYSE Euronext; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. at 81,968.
61. Id. at 81,970.
62. Id. at 81,968-69.
63. Id at 81,971.
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DB Group's divestiture of ISE, including removal of any affiliates from
leadership positions of ISE or its subsidiaries within two years. Future
similarly situated mergers could be subject to litigation against the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ, or at the least, having to make significant
concessions that devalue the merger as occurred in the NYX-DB merger
approval process.65
B.

German Regulatory Approval Process

Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht's (BaFin)
review of the proposed deal was less stringent as compared to the
scrutiny received in the American and European regulatory process.
BaFin's purpose is to ensure that transactions among German entities
are consistent with the European Union directives.67 Harmonization
among the European Union financial markets is the main objective of
the directives.68 BaFin's overall conclusion, although vague, was to
approve the merger. 69 On September 12, 2011, DB Group formally
announced that BaFin approved the merger. 70
C.

European Union Regulatory Approval Process

The European Commission is a part of the executive branch of
the European Union, responsible for implementing legislation.7 1 As
part of its authority, the European Commission investigates proposed
mergers and acquisitions in a mandatory first stage, and an optional
64. Id. at 81,968.
65. See Harro Ten Wolde & Foo Yun Chee, Boerse/NYSE Offer Concessions for
Merger
Approval,
REUTERS
(Nov.
18,
2011,
8:07
AM),
http://ca.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idCATRE7AHOO620111118.
66. See BaFin Approves Merger, supra note 23.
FUR
BUNDESANSTALT
Obligations,
General
generally
67. See
FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT,

http://www.bafin.de/cln_117/nn_720618/EN/Companies/Generalobligations/generalobligati
ons node.html?_nnn-true (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (discussing German companies'
obligations to BaFin and the European Union).
68. Id.
69. See BaFin Approves Merger, supra note 23.
70. Id.
71. See generally Directorate General for Competition, EUR. COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2012) (stating that
the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission is responsible for
enforcing European Union competition rules).

384

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 16

second stage if it determines the deal mandates further review.72
Executives from both NYX and DB Group anticipated a discretionary
The European
European Commission "Stage Two" probe.73
Commission considered several factors during the "Stage Two" probe,
including potential "unilateral" effects of the merger. 74 "Unilateral"
effects occur when:
a merger creates or strengthens a dominant position of a
single firm, one which, typically, would have an
appreciably larger market share than the next competitor
post-merger, or a merger in an oligopolistic market
involving the elimination of important competitive
restraints that the merging parties previously exerted
upon each other with a reduction of competitive pressure
on the remaining competitors.75
Arguments can be made that the proposed NYX-DB merger
would result in unilateral effects in that the combined entity would
likely have a significantly larger market share than its next closest
competitor, at least in the derivatives trading and clearing market. 76
Other factors the European Commission considered include
market transparency, vertical and horizontal relationships, 77
"conglomerate effects,"7 8 buying power, 79 and efficiencies.80 No single
72. Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 6, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 10.
73. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
74. See John J. Parisi, A Simple Guide to the EC Merger Regulation, FED. TRADE
COMM'N,
13
(last
updated
Jan.
1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/ECMergerRegSimpleGuide.pdf
75. Id.
76. See Hill, supra note 56.
77. An example of a simple vertical relationship is that of a manufacturer and a
distributor. It is a relationship with an independent non-competitor. See Astrid AblasserNeuhuber & Rend Plank, VerticalAgreements, THE EuR. ANTITRUST REV. (2011).
78. The European Court of Justice defined a "conglomerate" merger as: ". . a merger
of undertakings which, essentially, do not have a pre-existing competitive relationship,
either as direct competitors or as suppliers or customers. Mergers of this type do not give
rise to true horizontal overlaps between the activities of the parties to the merger or to a
vertical relationship between the parties in the strict sense of the term. Thus it cannot be
presumed as a general rule that such mergers produce anti-competitive effects. However,
they may have anti-competitive effects in certain cases." See Tetra Laval BV v. Eur.
Comm'n, 2002 E.R. 374 (2002); Parisi, supra note 74, at 13-14.
79. Buyer power is defined as "[t]he ability of customers to counter the increase in
market power that a proposed merger may create . . . ."Id. at 15.
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factor appeared conclusive; rather, the European Commission weighed
all the anti-competitive and countervailing factors and decided
holistically.
Despite fewer than six percent of European Commission
investigations requiring a "Stage Two" investigation," executives of
both companies foresaw a formal investigation and remained confident
that the European Commission would ultimately approve the merger. 82
Therefore, it did not come as a surprise to either NYX or DB Group
when the European Commission formally launched their Stage Two
To appease the European
investigation on August 4, 2011.8
Commission and the DOJ, NYX and DB Group offered several specific
concessions, including the companies' plans to "sell off significantly
overlapping parts of their single-stock equity derivatives businesses in
key markets, which include France, Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Britain." 84 In addition, the companies offered to
"allow rival exchanges to clear interest-rate and equity-index derivatives
on Deutsche Boerse's clearing house, Eurex Clearing, but only if the
products were 'new and innovative.' 85 In offering these concessions,
both companies acted with prudence by intentionally offering
concessions that would not significantly detract from the value of the
deal so much as to warrant abandonment of the merger altogether.86
The European Commission, which makes its decisions based on
the European Community Merger Regulation, scrutinized the proposed
NYX-DB merger to a higher standard than U.S. regulatory agencies.
80. Economies of scale are one example of an efficiency that could be realized by this
merger. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
81. See WILMERHALE, supranote 34.
82. See Aoife White & Nandini Sukumar, Deutsche Boerse, NYSE Euronext Merger to
Face Expanded EU Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2011, 2:40 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-04/deutsche-boerse-NYSE-euronext-merger-toface-expanded-eu-antitrust-probe.html (discussing the executives' full anticipation of the
Stage Two investigation and the potential for concessions to have to be made before the
European Commission will approve the merger).
83. Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation, supra note 42.
84. Wolde & Chee, supra note 65.
85. Id.
86. See generally Ulrike Dauer, NYSE, Deutsche Boerse Offer More Concessions to
Address Antitrust Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2011,
11:36 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/12/13/nyse-deutsche-boerse-offer-more-concessions-toaddress-antitrust-concerns/ [hereinafter Dauer, Concessions] (illustrating the delicate
balance between offering concessions to appease regulators and preserving the economic
value of the deal).
87. See EU Competition Law Rules Applicable to Merger Control, EUR. COMM'N,
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In Europe, exchange-traded derivatives would have accounted for
ninety-three percent of the combined entity's business. On the other
hand, futures trading would have accounted for only a fraction of the
combined entity's revenue in the United States, especially since DB
Group has no U.S. based trading platform.89
In mid-January 2012, it was rumored that the European
Commission would block the merger in a formal announcement to come
in early February. 90 On February 1, 2012, the European Commission
formally announced its blocking of the proposed NYX-DB merger.9 1
As of mid-February 2012, the European Commission's 450-page report
discussing its reasons for blocking the merger has not been released, but
it did release a brief summary of its conclusions.9 2 The European
Commission dubbed the proposed NYX-DB merger a "quasimonopoly" and cited the merger's effects on the European market for
financial derivatives, vis-A-vis the European interest rate, equity index
derivatives, and single stock equity, as a primary reason for its
decision. 93 Further, the European Commission argued that any benefits
and efficiencies to be realized by the merger would be outweighed by
the harm to competition caused by more than ninety percent of Europe's
exchange-traded derivatives being traded on a single exchange postmerger.94 As for NYX and DB Group's concessions, namely their
planned divestment of ISE, offered in hopes of ultimately garnering
regulatory approval, the European Commission was unsatisfied.
[T]he divested assets would be too small and not
diversified enough to be viable on a stand-alone basis.
In the commercially more significant area of European
interest rate derivatives, the companies did not offer to
sell overlapping derivatives products, but only offered to
provide access to the merged company's clearing for
This was
some categories of "new" contracts.
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger-compilation.pdf
Feb. 9, 2012); SEC Clears Way, supra note 4.
88. See SEC Clears Way, supra note 4.
89. Id.
90. See Steinhauser,supra note 12.
91. EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supranote 9.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. Id.

(last

visited
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considered as insufficient, in particular because it did
not extend to existing competing products. There were
also fundamental concerns about the workability and the
effectiveness of such an access remedy. 95
Following the European Commission's decision, NYX
announced on February 2, 2012 - almost a year after the companies
announced their plans to merge - that both companies decided to
terminate plans to merge in light of the European blocking.9 6 NYX and
DB Group decided to abandon merger plans instead of embarking on
what would have likely been a long and expensive appeals process.9 7
Further, the two companies would have faced slim chances of the
European Commission's decision being overturned on appeal. 98 While
the European Court of Justice has consistently followed the European
Commission's interpretation of the European Commission Merger
Regulation,99 it has, on rare occasion, taken its own view of the text.100
The European Commission's scrutiny towards the proposed merger is a
likely indicator for how it will treat such megamergers in the future.
Perhaps regulatory agencies are the single largest hindrance to the
globalization of international securities exchange mergers.
D.

Impact on the Derivatives TradingMarket

Derivatives trading is not just important to investor groups; it is
vital to the success of many global corporations.101 The implications
95. Id.
96. See NYSE and Deutsche Boerse Terminate, supra note 9.
97. Parisi, supra note 74, at 15.
98. Id. at 15.
99. Id.
100. For example, in 2006, the European Court of Justice overturned the European
Commissioner's approval of a merger between Sony and Bertelsmann AG ("BMG") on
grounds that it "did not properly show in 2004 that there was not a monopoly position
before the [merger] or that there would not be one afterward." Aoife White, Court
Overturns OK of Sony-BMG Unit Merger, THE ASSOCIATED PREsS (July 13, 2006, 04:50
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/07/13/AR2006071300186.html.
101. See Laurin C. Ariail, Note, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on End-Users Hedging
Commercial Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 175,
194 (2011) (citing Michelle Price, Hitting the Wrong Target, BANKER, Oct. 1, 2010). "A
derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from the performance of underlying
market factors, such as interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity, credit, and
equity prices. Derivative transactions include an assortment of financial contracts, including
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this merger would have on the derivatives trading market were the
subject of intense regulatory scrutiny. 102 Throughout the European
Commission's investigation of the NYX-DB merger, derivatives trading
and clearing presented the most pressing competition issues. 03 This is
because of the massive derivatives market share to which NYX-DB
would have obtained, 0 4 with NYX-DB controlling over ninety percent
of the European region's exchange-traded derivatives market. 0 5 Over
the past decade, over-the-counter derivatives trading has grown
significantly,106 growing at a faster rate than exchange-traded
derivatives, and representing a significantly larger piece of the entire
derivatives trading market. 0 7 Aggregating the futures and options
derivatives markets, NYX-DB would have controlled approximately
ninety-nine percent of interest rate derivatives, ninety-five percent of
equity derivatives, and ninety-one percent of index derivatives.'0 8
Proponents of the deal argued that this merger would actually be
beneficial, not only for the companies involved, but for the derivatives
market as a whole.109 Because of the rapidly growing and high-yielding
nature of the derivatives market, an integrated and cost-efficient market
structured debt obligations and deposits, swaps, futures, options, caps, floors, collars,
forwards, and various combinations thereof." Derivatives, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE

CURRENCY,

http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-

markets/trading/derivatives/index-derivatives.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
102. See Steinhauser, supra note 12.
103. See generally Joe Kirwin, EC Review of NYSE-Deutsche Borse Merger Moves to
Stage Two; Investors Urge Scrutiny, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1652 (Aug. 8,
2011) (quoting European Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia's explanation for the
Stage Two probe of the merger).
104. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
105. See Nandini Sukumar & Aoife White, Deutsche Boerse-NYSE Said to Prepare
Offer to European Union After Meeting, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2011, 1:41 PM),
http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/20 11-11-i 0/deutsche-boerse-nyse-said-to-prepare-offerto-european-union-after-meeting.
106. See generally Henrik Enderlein, The Economic Impact of the Deutsche BdrseNYSE Euronext Merger on the European Financial Markets, HERTIE SCHOOL OF
http://www.hertie2011),
(Sept.
GOVERNANCE

school.org/fileadmin/images/Downloads/enderlein merger Study/Enderlein mergerstudy_f
inal.pdf (citing data from BIS, FESE, WFE) (showing the relationship between exchangetraded and over-the-counter derivatives and their growth over the past decade).
107. See generally id.
108. See Position Paper on the ProposedMerger Between Deutsche Bdrse and NYSEEuronext,
EuR.
PRINCIPAL
TRADERS
Assoc.
1
(July
2011),
http://www.futuresindustry.org/epta/downloads/FIAEPTA position on DB NYSE merger.pdf [hereinafter Position] (citing World Federation
of Exchange statistics such as notional turnover; options and futures market aggregated).
109. See generally Enderlein,supra note 106.
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structure is ideal." 0 Although NYX-DB would have dominated the
European derivatives market, the companies argue "[t]he derivatives
market is global and not European.""' This merger would have been
one step in the direction of a truly global derivatives exchange that
would allow the companies and the market to realize incredible cost
efficiencies and economies of scale that would be all but impossible
without the combined resources of both companies."12
The potential anti-competitive effects on the derivatives trading
market, however, were enough to influence the European Union
Commission decision in rejecting the merger.' 13 "[A]ntitrust authorities
focus on the tradeoff between the costs of allowing the creation of a
monopoly power with the benefits of efficiency gains that may be
The NYX-DB derivatives
passed through to consumers."1 4
two largest derivatives
the
incorporated
powerhouse would have
5
exchanges in Europe," Eurex and NYSE Liffe, as well as the
International Securities Exchange, NYSE Arca, and NYSE Amex." 6
Prior to the proposed merger of DB Group and NYX, derivatives
trading accounted for forty percent and thirty-three percent of the 2010
net revenue mix. 1' 7 Although the combined derivatives trading market
share for NYX-DB would have only accounted for thirty-seven percent
of the combined entity's revenue mix,1 18 the problem was that the
110. Id.
111. Dauer, Update, supra note 2.
112. See NiederauerQ&A, supra note 29.
113. See Commission Opens In-Depth Investigation, supra note 42; Press Release,
Dep't of Justice: Office of Pub. Affairs, NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and
IntercontinentalExchange Inc. Abandon Their Proposed Acquisition of NYSE Euronext
(May
16,
2011),
Department
Threatens
Lawsuit
After
Justice
that NASDAQ
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 1/May/ 11 -at-622.html (announcing
withdrew its bid to merger with NYX after the Department of Justice threatened to bring an
antitrust suit against the merger for reasons including, but not limited to, the fact that
NASDAQ and NYX are the only two U.S. competitors that provide certain services with
regard to equity options).
114. Matthew Weinberg, The PriceEffects of Horizontal Mergers: A Survey 1 (Univ. of
Ga.,
Ctr. of Econ. Policy Studies,
Working Paper No. 140, 2007),
http://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/140weinberg.pdf.
115. See Will Acworth, Annual Volume Survey: 2010 Record Volume, FUTURES
INDUSTRY Assoc. 4 (Mar. 2011), http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/VolumeMar FI%28R%29.pdf (ranking the top derivative exchanges worldwide, measured by the
number of "[fjutures and [o]ptions [t]raded and/or [c]leared in 2010").
116. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20;
infra App. A.
117. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
118. Id.
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merger would have eliminated NYX as the next largest competitor
behind Eurex." 9
Ranked according to the "number of futures and options
contracts traded and/or cleared,"1 20 Eurex (which jointly owns ISE) is
the third largest global derivatives exchange, clearing $2.64 billion
dollars in calendar year 2010, a -1/5% change from calendar year
2009.121 NYX (which includes exchanges in both the United States and
European Union markets because of the NYSE-Euronext merger in
2007) is the fourth largest global derivatives exchange, clearing $2.15
billion dollars in calendar year 2010, a remarkable 24% change from
calendar year 2009.122 This translated into net trading revenue of $668
million for NYX.1 23 For calendar year 2010, NYX held approximately
10% of the global market for futures trading and options contracts while
Eurex held approximately 12% of the global market for futures trading
and options contracts. 124 If the proposed merger had been completed,
NYX-DB would have held a commanding lead in the global derivatives
market with an approximate 22% market share, 125 with its next closest
competitor being the Korea Exchange with a 17% market share.126
Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), chairman of Congress's
Judiciary Committee's Intellectual Property, Competition, and the
Internet Subcommittee, discussed the need for a thorough examination
of the merger, especially for "horizontal" aspects of the merger.127
Generally, the goal of antitrust policy is to prevent mergers that would
result in price increases, one of the most common effects of horizontal
mergers.128
The subcommittee chairman also noted that the merger
would combine the third and fourth largest equity
119. See Sukumar & White, supra note 105; Acworth, supra note 115, at 1.
120. See Acworth, supra note 115, at 6.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Euronext Announces Fourth Quarter
and
Full-Year
2009
Financial
Results
(Feb.
9,
2010),
http://www.nyse.com/press/1265627527144.html (reporting year-end financial highlights).
124. See infra App. A.
125. See infra App. A.
126. See Acworth, supranote 115, at 6.
127. Horizontal aspects of the merger include those that "could affect the stature of the
companies' subsidiaries, which also hold stakes in the trading business." Hill, supra note 56.
128. See Weinberg, supra note 114.
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options exchanges in the United States with Deutsche
Boerse's [International Stock Exchange]. 'Combined,'
Goodlatte stated, 'the new entity will control three of the
nine American-based equity options exchanges, and a
larger share of the American equity options market than
any other company." 29
NYX chief operating officer Larry Leibowitz responded to
Congress's apprehensions with a discussion of the intense competition
in the current equity options market, which includes thirteen stock
exchanges and nine trading venues.130 According to executives from
NYX, DB Group, and their subsidiaries, this merger would have created
synergies and efficiencies necessary to offset declining profit margins
and fee compression that has been the result of fierce competition in the
equity options market. 13 1
European Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia
discussed a few specific concerns regarding the impact on the
derivatives trading market, namely NYX-DB's proposition "[requiring]
the clearing of all over-the-counter-derivatives,"' 32 which would have
had to be consistent with pending European Union legislation on the
subject. 133 Other sources of concern, though not explicitly referenced
by Almunia, included the possibility for a less competitive central
counterparty environment,134 decreased access to market data,135 and a
diminished commitment to innovation.136 Finally, competitors argued
that the exclusive access to license indexing is inherently anticompetitive. 137 "[NYX] developed its proprietary indexes to showcase
the strength of companies listed and traded on the Exchange, and to
provide investors and issuers with benchmarks that measure the world's
largest marketplace as well as its key segments." 38 Exclusive access
129.
130.
20.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Hill, supra note 56.
See id.; Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note
See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
See Kirwin, supra note 103.
Id.
See Position,supra note 108, at 1; EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
See Position,supra note 108, at 1.
Id.
Id.
NYSE Indexes, NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/NyseIndexes.pdf (last visited
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and control to these indices is proprietary material that has significant
intellectual property value that would be diminished if the companies
provided liberal access to such indices. 1 39 NYX and DB Group offered
concessions on this issue, but ultimately the European Commission was
unsatisfied.140
IV. COSTS OF THE PROPOSED MERGER

A.

External Costs

External factors, such as the economic conditions of some
members of the European Union 4 1 and the concern that Germany may
have to bail out these countries at some point in the future, 142
contributed to the declining value of the proposed merger since its
inception in February 2011.143 In 2011, the value of the merger had
declined about thirty percent, amounting to the largest decline of "any
all-stock takeover worth $1 billion or more."1 44 Another significant cost
included the numerous concessions that NYX and DB Group made to
various regulatory agencies in an attempt to gather their approval.14 5
These efforts were ultimately for naught since the European
Commission blocked the merger regardless, 146 and NYX and DB Group
decided to abandon the merger plans shortly thereafter.147 The
miscellaneous costs with respect to the proposed NYX-DB merger
might be extraordinary, but they do indicate issues that any similarly
Jan. 22, 2012) (discussing the value for investors in the NYSE indices).
139. See Jacob Bunge et al., Exchanges Offer Some Remedies, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19,
2011), http://online.wsj.article/SB10001424052970203699404577045454006297824.html
(announcing the companies would not offer a concession to EU anti-trust authorities
regarding exclusive access to the licensing of these indices).
140. See EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
141. See Andrea Thomas, German Lawmaker Wants Greek Bailout Vote In One
Package, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120208711936.html.
142. See Inyoung Hwang et al., NYSE Owners Become Biggest Losers on Niederauer's
German Embrace: Real M&A,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:25 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-16/nyse-owners-become-biggest-losers-onniederauer-s-german-embrace-real-m-a.html (discussing the factors contributing to the
decline in value of the merger since the proposed merger was announced in February 2011).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
147. See NYSE and Deutsche Boerse Terminate, supra note 9.
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situated merger must be prepared to deal with at least to a certain extent.
B.

Litigation andLobbying Costs

Just two days after the companies announced their plans to
merge, a class action lawsuit was filed by Samuel T. Cohen,
individually and on behalf of other NYX shareholders, claiming, among
other things, a breach of NYX's fiduciary duties due to a lack of
adequate consideration and a "flawed process."1 48 The suit also claims
that any premium NYX shareholders will realize will be offset by the
fact that DB Group lost about $82.6 million dollars in the last fiscal
quarter of 2010.149 The proposed merger and subsequent regulatory
process had a consistently negative impact on both companies' stock
prices, especially NYX. 50
NYSE is incorporated in Delaware,"'1 subjecting it to the
jurisdiction and substantive laws of the state.152 In Delaware, the
"business judgment rule" is presumed to apply to most executive
actions,153 especially in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 154 The
business judgment rule would likely preclude most claims arising from
this merger, unless a claimant could prove that NYX directors acted in
bad faith, on an uninformed basis, or that NYX directors were not
acting in the best interest of the corporation.' 55 Usually, claimants can
148. See Amended Verified Class Action Complaint, Cohen v. NYSE Euronext, No.
6198-VCS, 2011 WL 601437 (Del. Ch. filed Feb. 18, 2011).
149. Id.
150. See Hwang et al., supra note 142; NYSE Euronext (NYX) Down 6% as Value of
Deutsche Boerse Slides, MARKET INTELLIGENCE CM. (Sept. 19, 2011, 10:27 AM),
http://www.marketintelligencecenter.com/newsbites/1302303.
151. Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporationof NYSE Group, Inc.,
NYSE (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nysegroup cert-of incorporation.pdf.
152. See Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Choose Delaware, DEL. DEP'T OF
STATE Div. OF CORPs., 7-8 (2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations web.pdf.
153. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2011) ("(e) A member of the board of
directors, or a member of any committee designated by the board of directors, shall, in the
performance of such member's duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements
presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's officers or employees, or
committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member
reasonably believes are within such other person's professional or expert competence and
who has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.").
154. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928 (Del. 2003);
In re LNR Prop. Corp. S'holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 174-75 (Del. Ch. 2005).
155. See Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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only "pierce the corporate veil" 56 in instances of fraud.157
In the second quarter of the 2011, NYX spent over half a million
dollars lobbying to Congress, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission on issues ranging from limiting legislation
affecting small business, consumer protection with respect to the
derivatives market, and other subjects relating to the announced
merger.15 8 That large figure does not even take into account the intense
and costly amount of lobbying both NYX and DB Group expended in
their futile efforts to garner European Commission approval of the
proposed merger. 159 Litigation and lobbying costs are both effects of
the regulatory approval process, and these characteristics will likely be
consistent with any similarly situated merger to occur in the near future.
C.

Miscellaneous Costs

Should NYX have terminated DB Group's offer unilaterally, it
would have been subject to a termination fee of $340 million.160
Additional costs include that NYX-DB's infrastructure would have had
to adapt to a significantly increased volume of trades, the predicted cost
of which is much less quantifiable.161 NYX-DB would have likely
invested in expensive innovative technologies to address this
problem.162 Traders would have also potentially been subject to
increased transaction costs because "[c]ross-border trading costs are still
higher than domestic trading costs due to fragmentation and the
incomplete integration and consolidation of the European trading and
post-trading markets."1 63 However, what would have likely happened is
that the trading platforms would have largely stayed the same, as was
156. See Harvey Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil-The UndercapitalizationFactor,
59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
157. See id.
158. See NYSE Spent $530K on Lobbying in 2Q, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 30,
2011,
6:45 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9Q34D8GO.htm
(reporting how NYX spent a significant amount of money lobbying in the weeks and
months following the unveiling of the merger).
159. See Steinhauser,supra note 12; EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note 9.
160. See Edward Taylor, Deutsche Boerse Says on Track to Clinch NYSE, REUTERS
(Sept.
29,
2011,
5:08
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/idUKL5E7KTIBQ20110929.
161. See Enderlein, supra note 106.
162. Id.
163. Id
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the case following the merger of NYSE and Euronext in 2007.16
D.

Post-mergerRisks

Had the merger ultimately passed regulatory muster, several
post-merger risks would have existed, perhaps the most notable being
that the merger could have created an entity that was "too-big-tofail." 165 Generally, entities that are too-big-to-fail are those that, in
times of crisis, have extremely detrimental effects on both their
industries and the general economy, and may even require government
intervention.166 During times of prosperity, these entities enjoy high
competitive advantages and may engage in risky business ventures
because they are able to obtain low interest rates in funding said
ventures.167
In concentrated markets, such as exchange-traded
derivatives, these too-big-to-fail entities pose the highest risk to their
industry.1 68
V.

BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED MERGER

The three main benefits of global exchange consolidation, which
both NYX and DB promised would have been characteristic of the
NYX-DB merged entity, include the diversification of revenue
sources, 169 the alignment of all the stakeholders of both companies'
interests in cutting costs and maximizing revenues,170 and the potential
to create a transnational trading platform.' 7 ' Such a platform would
have provided traders with the ability to buy and sell securities on both
exchanges,1 72 and helped both companies realize economies of scale
164. See Pownall et al., supra note 10, at 5.
165. See Goodlatte Statement, supra note 57.
166. See Bernard Shull, Professor Emeritus, Hunter College, CUNY, Bank Merger
Policy in a Too-Big-To-Fail Environment, Remarks Prepared for the 19th Annual Hyman P.
Minsky Conference Levy Economics Institute of Bard College at the Ford Foundation 2-3
(Apr.
14-16,
2011),
http://www.1evyinstitute.org/pubs/conf aprill0/19thMinsky Shulldft.pdf.
167. Id.
168. Id
169. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Marketsfor Securities Laws, 75
U. CHI. L. REv. 1435, 1475 (2008).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1476
172. Id.
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that would otherwise not have occurred without the pooling of both
companies' resources.173 These benefits for NYX-DB were facially
detrimental to competitors in the exchange market. However, "[i]t is
the impact on effective competition that matters, not the mere impact on
competitors at some level of the supply chain. In particular, the fact that
rivals may be harmed because a merger creates efficiencies cannot in
itself give rise to competition concerns."l74
DB Group and NYX attempted to sell their shareholders on the
merger in a presentation in which executives focused on the piecemeal
strengths of each company and the cumulative strength of a combined
new company. 175 NYX-DB would have provided a trading venue for
every kind of European and U.S. asset type, with an estimated trading
volume of more than $20 trillion per year.1 76 Among the strengths
listed for DB Group is its status as the "[l]eader in derivatives trading
and clearing," 7 7 its "[s]trong suite of world class settlement and
custody services,"17 8 and its "[u]nique clearing and risk management
expertise across major asset classes."l 79
In addition to the value of the NYX brand name alone, NYX
and DB Group executives focused on NYX's status as the "[p]remier
global listing venue and world leading cash equities venue."' 80
Although less prominent in derivatives trading than DB Group, NYX
still maintains a "[s]trong derivatives trading presence in [both the
United States and the European Union]."' 8 ' Executives assured longterm benefits to all stakeholders, including shareholders, investors,
intermediaries, issuers, creditors, employees, and regulators.' 82
173. Id.
174. Parisi, supranote 74, at 14.
175. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
176. See Taylor, supranote 160.
177. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. The benefits they assure for the various groups are as follows: for shareholders,
executives promise "[s]uperior value creation through enhanced growth profile and
significant synergies." For investors, they promise "deeper, more liquid and transparent
markets." For intermediaries, they promise "[i]mproved risk management, cost and capital
efficiencies." For issuers, they promise "increase[d] choice, visibility and global access."
For
For creditors, they promise "[s]trong cash flow generation and credit profile."
employees, they promise "[e]nhanced career opportunities across all locations of global
exchange group. For regulators, they promise a [g]lobal benchmark regulatory model while
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Together, NYX-DB promised to be "[tihe world leader in
derivatives and risk management, [t]he largest, most recognized capital
raising venue in the world, [t]he most compelling exchange provider of
technology services and information content, [and] [t]he global pioneer
in international post-trade infrastructure and settlement."'8 3 Crossselling, new offerings, and distribution opportunities that would have
been created by the merger are expected to yield cost savings synergies
of $580 million and to generate at least $218 million in revenue
synergies.184
In addition to the cost-cutting synergies, global securities
consolidation lends itself to creating more liquidity for global
investors,
increasing capital raising profits to corporations,186 and
realizing several economies of scale. 187 With respect to the failed NYXDB merger, the whole would have been more valuable than the sum of
its parts. Still, several risks existed which would have required
management, including but not limited to: the risk of systemic
instability resulting in failure, and the risk of the European market
becoming too fragmented.'8 8 The former risk of systemic instability
resulting in failure is likely the most significant given that this merger
arguably creates an entity that is too-big-to-fail, especially in the
European market.189
Because of the increasing number of worldwide stock
exchanges-over 300-the United States has seen a steady decline in its
share of the global equity market, down to thirty-one percent in 2009, as
compared to sixty-six percent in 1990.190 Despite some concerns
preserving national regulatory rules." Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To
Combine, supra note 20.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see also Zacks Analyst Blog Highlights, supra note 43. Synergies in the
context of mergers and acquisitions mean that the whole is worth more than the sum of the
entity's parts. Cost-savings mergers are generally more successful than synergy-focused
mergers. Synergy is sometimes the more qualitative of the two measures. See Aswath
Damodaran, Acquisition Valuation: Seven Steps back to Sanity, N.Y. UNIV.,
http://people.stem.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/country/acqanon.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2012).
185. See Palmer,supra note 23.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Enderlein, supra note 106, at 12.
189. See Goodlatte Statement, supra note 57; EC Blocks Proposed Merger, supra note
9.
190. See Palmer, supra note 23.
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regarding exchanges' traditional roles as "operators of domestic capital
markets,"' 91 the combined force of the NYX-DB entity would have
served as a significant reminder of American and European dominance
in these markets to non-American and non-European exchanges
competing for exchange industry market share, such as the Singapore or
Hong Kong Exchanges.192 Some argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 hindered the United States' competitive position in the global
exchange market.' 93 This merger would have likely increased the
number of foreign stocks listed in the United States and the merged
entity would have regained some of the initial public offerings (IPO)
being lost to other exchanges.1 94 The combined mammoth of a
company would also have been quite an attractive exchange for
companies; NYX alone led the global market for IPOs in the first
quarter of 2011, with almost $15 billion in capital raised.195 Both U.S.
and worldwide IPO listings have declined because of economic
factors,' 96 necessitating that NYX make strategic decisions to ensure
that it continues to obtain new IPO listings.197 Post-merger, companies
would have likely found security in the fact that NYX-DB would have
been a massive international exchange continuing to grow in most, if
not all, markets.
On a macroeconomic level, the NYX-DB merger would have
also benefitted local and global economies, as well as transatlantic
financial security.198 "[T]he merger contributes to current regulatory
efforts toward more financial stability through the strengthening of a
regulated exchange that provides a strong, liquid [competitive central
counterparty] with risk management capabilities within the euro area
jurisdiction . . ."199 Further, the consolidation of two major competitors
191. See Jacob Bunge et. al., 2nd Update: Deutsche-Boerse-NYSE Merger Clears US
Regulatory Hurdle, Dow JoNEs NEWSWIRES (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110823-711590.html (emphasis added).
192. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
193. See generally Palmer, supra note 23.
194. Id.
195. See Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Euronext Announces Strong First
Quarter
2011
Financial
Results
(Apr.
28,
2011),
http://www.nyse.com/press/1303951095628.html.
196. See
IPO
Showcase,
NYSE
EuRONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/IPO_Index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
197. Id.
198. Enderlein, supra note 106, at 1.
199. Id.
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in the global exchange industry would have helped place both the
United States and the European Union in a better position to compete
with other global competitors, especially the Asian markets. 2 00 In
November of 2011, for example, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc.
(Tokyo) and Osaka Securities Exchange Co. (Osaka), Japan's two
biggest exchanges, announced their plans to merge. 201 If completed,
this merger would have created the third largest global exchange,
behind NYX and NASDAQ OMX Group Inc.20 2
VI. ARGUMENT FOR APPROVING THE MERGER
The benefits to these individual companies are unquestionable;
NYX-DB would have been the largest exchange group in the world,20 3
with diversified revenue sources. 204 It was, however, the anticompetitive potential that posed the greatest problem.205 There are
several theories regarding this merger's harmful effect on competition.
First, the theory of non-coordinated, or unilateral,2 0 6 effects describes

situations in which two companies merge and the post-merger result is a
company that has a significantly larger market share than its next largest
competitor.207 Opponents of the NYX-DB merger argued this would
occur if NYX and DB Group merged. However, if the combined entity
had complied with the DOJ's adjudication requiring divestment of
ISE,208 this would have surely lessened the dominance the combined
entity would have had on the derivatives trading market.
A second theory of competitive harm is coordinated effects, or
the possibility of a merger that appears to create an oligopoly. 209
Although there are only a few global exchanges that hold a
commanding market share,210 the market as a whole consists of dozens

200. Id. at 38-49.
201. Hosaka, supra note 3.
202. Id.
203. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 20.
204. Brummer, supra note 169, at 1475.
205. Millman, supra note 59.
206. Parisi, supra note 74, at 13.
207. Id.
208. See United States v. Deutsche Borse AG and NYSE Euronext; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,968, 81,976 (Dec. 29, 2011).
209. Parisi, supra note 74, at 13.
210. Acworth, supra note 115, at 6-7.
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of competitors.211 This merger is likely a foreshadowing of many other
global mergers.212 The theory of coordinated effects does not appear to
predict any significant competitive harm to the exchange market should
the NYX-DB merger have been approved.
NYX and DB Group argued that the merger would create value
for all involved stakeholders-creditors, employees, regulators,
shareholders, investors, intermediaries, and issuers. 213 For NYX-DB's
creditors, such as financial institutions across the globe, the merger
would have created a significant cash flow generation through the
capital raised in its continually growing number of IPO offerings,214
"geographic and product diversification," 2 15 and a strong competitive
advantage. 2 16 For investment banks, NYX-DB would have "[c]reate[d]
deeper, liquid, and more transparent markets," 217 along with improved
customer service and an infrastructure that would have allowed for
*
218
simpler worldwide connectivity.
With respect to the cost of potential litigation, the business
judgment rule would have precluded most shareholder derivative or
other related claims from occurring. 219 Should any suits not have been
summarily dismissed, judgment in the plaintiffs' favor would have been
unlikely given how tough it is to win shareholder derivatives suits. 220
The three main arguments against the merger can be summed up
in the potential for "higher prices, inferior service, and less
innovation." 221 In the context of this failed merger, higher prices would
have been unlikely given the economies of scale and cost efficiency the
companies stood to gain.22 2 In addition to the companies' promise for
211. Id.
212. See Hosaka, supra note 3; but see John McCrank, NYSE Euronext CEO: "Megamergers
Unlikely
for
Now,
REUTERS
(Feb.
3,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/04/nyseeuronext-idUSL2E8D408G20120204.
213. See Deutsche Boerse AG And NYSE Euronext Agree To Combine, supra note 21.
214. Id.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

219. See, e.g., Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 984 (Del. Ch.
2000).
220. See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuit as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, UNIV. OF ARK.,
available at 143http://comp.uark.edu/-tjandik/papers/DerivativesJFQA.pdf
221. See Goodlatte Statement, supra note 57.
222.

Id.
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improved customer service and a more accessible and easy-to-use
infrastructure for traders, 223 a decrease in service quality would have
also been unlikely for another reason. Other plans for international
megamergers, such as the proposed NASDAQ-London Stock Exchange
merger or the planned Tokyo-Osaka merger, would have necessitated
NYX-DB's continued quality of service for NYX-DB to remain
224
Despite the fact that the companies both flaunted
competitive.
improved innovation as a proposed benefit of the merger, 225 they also
addressed this concern about decreased innovation post-merger in one
of their concessions to the European Commission.226 The companies
maintained innovation as a key benefit of the proposed merger and
conceded an important issue when they said "they would allow rival
exchanges to clear interest-rate and equity-index derivatives on
Eurex Clearing, but only if the
Deutsche Boerse's clearing house, 227
products were 'new and innovative."'
VII. CONCLUSION

The failed NYX-DB deal is the most recent and one of the most
high-valued proposed international stock exchange mergers in
history.228 Megamergers such as this one represent huge mediums
through which profits and economies of scale can be realized.229 In
addition to other stock exchanges already proposing international
megamergers similar to NYX-DB,230 it is doubtless that several others
will follow in the footsteps of NYX and DB Group. Perhaps the most
important lesson competitors can learn from the NYX-DB merger
disapproval is to be more forward thinking in choosing with whom to
merge. DB Group has a subsidiary that is a direct competitor with

223. Id
224. See Jonathan Spicer, Nasdaq in Spotlight as Merger Speculation Heats Up,
REUTERS (June 30, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/30/us-nasdaq-lseidUSTRE75T4T420110630; Hasaka, supra note 3.
225. Spicer, supra note 224; see also Hosaka,supra note 3.
226. See Dauer, Concessions,supra note 86.
227. Wolde & Chee, supra note 65.
228. See Cyrus Sanati, How the NYSE Can Save its Mega Merger, CNNMoNEY (Jan.
13, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/13/nyse-deutsche-boersemerger/.
229. See Enderlein, supra note 106, at 11.
230. See Hosaka, supra note 3.
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NYX, in an already concentrated derivatives trading market. 231 if
exchanges could avoid merging with companies that are directly
competing in a highly concentrated segment of the overall global
exchange market, they are less likely to be scrutinized as intensely as
the proposed NYX-DB merger.23 2
Despite the fact that this deal was disapproved and ultimately
abandoned, 233 it represents overarching trends of globalization within
financial markets, 234 and the markets' reaction to this through global
exchange consolidation. 235 Technology and communication-two of
the most influential factors that drive the international stock exchange
market-are becoming increasingly globalized.236 It is inevitable that
the international stock exchange market will follow suit eventually,
even though the proposed NYX-DB merger failed.237
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APPENDIX

A.

Table showing major internationalexchange groups and their
respective market shareS238:

%

Market Share

Change

(Year ending
2010)
0.085081648

Exchange Group

Jan-Dec 2009

Jan-Dec 2010

Eurex
International Securities

1,687,159,298

1,896,916,398

12.40%

960,247,551

745,176,328

-22.40%

Eurex Total

2,647,406,849

2,642,092,726

-0.20%

0.11850475

Liffe U.K.

598,103,720

660,976,088

10.50%

0.029646502

NYSE Arca Options
Liffe (single stock
derivatives)
NYSE Amex Options

421,349,395

488,093,760

15.80%

0.021892278

369,915,322

464,562,718

25.60%

248,119,861

440,021,234

77.30%

0.0197361

Liffe Paris

51,997,947

58,302,870

12.10%

0.002615036

Liffe Amsterdam

35,627,147

38,421,211

7.80%

0.001723292

NYSE Liffe U.S.

4,483,941

4,070,516

-9.20%

0.000182573

Liffe Brussels

306,735

167,758

-45.30%

7.52438E-06

Liffe Lisbon

61,225

126,127

106.00%

5.65712E-06

NYSE Euronext Total

1,729,965,293

2,154,742,282

24.60%

0.096645811

Exchange

0.033423102

0.02083685

238. Numbers were calculated using the figures from Year 2010 in Note 77 above. See
Acworth, supra note 115, at 6.

